Category Archives: Regulation

WSBA Ethics Opinion on . . . Avvo

I missed this when writing about the Washington State Bar’s new ethics opinion regarding online lead generation, but the bar has also issued an opinion on attorneys participating in an unnamed service that sounds an awful lot like Avvo:

1. May Lawyer claim the profile and provide personal and professional information, knowing that the website will generate a publicly viewable numeric and descriptive rating
that is, at least in part, influenced by the amount of information that Lawyer provides?

2. May Lawyer claim the profile and participate in the website if other users attach to Lawyer’s profile publicly viewable (1) client ratings or (2) peer endorsements about Lawyer’s services?

3. May Lawyer endorse another lawyer in exchange for a reciprocal endorsement?

The WSBA’s conclusions are, unsurprisingly, Yes, Yes, & No.

Despite once again failing to acknowledge the first amendment boundaries on the bar’s ability to regulate in this area, the WSBA concludes that lawyers can indeed use this mysterious service, provided the communications involved are not materially misleading. A few nuggets from, and thoughts on, the opinion:

  • Lawyers are to take “reasonable steps” to ascertain how the service will make representations about the lawyer, and should not participate (other than to ensure information is accurate) if the service does not disclose how ratings are calculated.
  • In case you’re wondering, you can read about how the Avvo Rating is calculated here and here.
  • Attorneys who claim a profile have an obligation to ensure the information in the profile remains accurate and up-to-date. That’s straightforward enough, and – regardless of what you might think of this as a regulatory mandate – is a critical practice for online reputation management.
  • Client reviews and endorsements must be “accurate.” I don’t think that word means what the bar thinks it means – reviews and endorsements are typically statements of opinion, and as such are not amenable to determinations of “accuracy.” In any event, to the extent an endorsement refers to factual inaccuracies, an attorney can delete it from their Avvo profile. However, for reasons that should be obvious, Avvo does not allow attorneys to delete client reviews.
  • I rather suspect that the Bar’s reading of an obligation upon attorneys to monitor-and-attempt-to-remove “inaccurate” client reviews and endorsements is preempted by 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1).
  • The Bar says that lawyers can’t “logroll” endorsements – provide an endorsement simply because the other lawyer agrees to post a reciprocal endorsement. I don’t agree with the opinion’s conclusion that reciprocal endorsements violate the rule against “providing something of value for recommending a lawyer’s services.” That rule has been swallowed by its exceptions – including, notably, the right to pay for advertising – and is long overdue to be eliminated.  However, we at Avvo have always advocated against logrolling endorsements. Posting – or accepting – endorsements in the absence of familiarity with the other lawyer’s work looks deceptive, shoddy, and cheap. Endorsements are best, for the lawyer and potential clients, if they provide a specific, detailed view of what makes that lawyer stand out.

WSBA Ethics Opinion re Online Lead Generation

The Washington State Bar (of which I am a member) has issued an ethics opinion finding that attorneys can, generally speaking, participate in online lead generation services.

While it’s good to see the WSBA take this step, it isn’t breaking new ground. The centerpiece of the opinion reflects the comments (paragraph 5) the ABA added to Model Rule 7.2 last year.

Unsurprisingly, I also have a few beefs with the opinion.

Too Many Rules

First of all, I wish we could simply dispense with all of this nonsense. Attorneys can advertise – in any of a million ways, as long as such advertising isn’t false or deceptive. We’re burning far too many brain cells, and depriving consumers of far too much information, worrying about all of these irrelevant details. We should simply eliminate most attorney advertising regulation as the counter-productive surplussage it is.

What First  Amendment?

It would have been nice if the Bar had given a nod to the First Amendment, and the substantial constraints it places on regulation of commercial speech.  Too few bars do this in their ethics opinions, and fewer still actually interpret their rules (at least when giving ethics guidance) as if they are subject to the First Amendment. In this case, the Bar stuck exclusively to citing chapter and verse from its own Rules of Professional Conduct.

Forms of Payment for Advertising

While acknowledging that attorneys can participate in online lead generation, the opinion does not come flat out and say that attorneys can pay for such advertising on a per-lead or per-client basis. They imply as much, via a footnote, but the opinion would be clearer and more useful if they just came out and said it.

Words Attorneys Can’t Say

The foolishness around “specialists” and “experts” continues. Again, this IS what the Bar’s rules seem to call for. But the Bar would be wise to clarify that restrictions on the use of such language by attorneys are only constitutional to the extent such terms are accompanied by a statement or implication that a third party has certified such specialization or expertise.  For example: as long as I’m not saying or implying that someone has conferred the honorific upon me, I’m confident the Bar can’t prohibit me from stating that I have expertise in attorney advertising regulation and communications law.

And Yet More Over-Regulation

The Bar properly notes the issue with “lawyer referral services,” insofar as they suggest they are “matching” a client to the best possible lawyer but instead sending them to the attorney who has paid for promotion.  That’s no good; it deceives consumers and would violate even a sensible and limited set of ad rules.

However, the Bar goes too far in stating that it is likely “that prospective clients will infer that the lead generation service is making subjective matching decisions.”

Says who? Does the Bar have any empirical evidence showing that consumers make these kinds of assumptions?

There is a long list of federal court decisions over the last ten years dismantling attorney advertising regulation precisely for making these sort of evidence-free conclusions. Attorney regulators carry the burden of showing that their attempts to limit speech are both necessary and no more extensive than required.

Instead of making such a case, the Bar plows ahead to solve this “problem” by requiring that lead generation services “clearly disclose, in plain and conspicuous language, that the match was made solely based on specified objective information (e.g., geographic information, years of practice, or practice areas as described by the lawyer).” Such a “solution” is not only unsupported by any evidence that it is necessary, but is also overbroad in not acknowledging that there are many ways a company could market to consumers without implying that it was “matching” them to the right attorney based on subjective factors.

It comes full circle to my first point: by continuing to rely on such picayune, detailed advertising rules, the Bar makes it harder than it should be consumers to get information about, and access to, legal services.

 

End Occupational Licensing . . . For Lawyers Too?

This New York Times article starts out with some well-deserved gushing over how Uber has disrupted the incumbent taxicab industry, but goes on to note the increasing skepticism over occupational licensing in general. The Obama administration has proposed sending some $15M in federal funding to the states to study the costs and benefits of occupational licensing.

As the article notes, there are a lot of weird anomalies in occupational licensing requirements, and a paucity of data showing that such requirements actually produce better consumer outcomes.

One thing we do know, however: occupational licensing is great for establishing a cartel that keeps prices high, and which fights viciously to keep competitors out.

Which naturally made me think of the Bars.

Uber is upsetting the cab cartels, and it’s pretty certain that some of the excesses of licensing expansion (license requirements for hair braiding, anyone?) are going to be pulled back. But what if we did something really outlandish and eliminated the occupational licensing requirement for lawyers? What would happen?

One belief held by many lawyers is that occupational licensing protects clients by ensuring a competency. If that argument sounds familiar, it should – it’s used by approximately 100% of all occupational licensing proponents.

Perhaps the Obama administration funding will get through and we’ll start seeing more hard data on this. But let’s pause for a moment and ask ourselves whether the claim of heightened competence is really true for the Bar.

To be sure, the necessities of going to law school (typically) and passing the bar act as gates to the completely vacant offering up legal services. But I’ve got news for you: it’s not that high of a gate. And it only tests one, narrow type of competence. There are a lot of really bad lawyers out there. Maybe not really bad in the knowin’ the law kind of way (although I’ve run across plenty of those), but really bad in the have-their-shit-together-and-can-communicate-with-real-people kind of way. Or can-run-their-business-effectively kind of way.

The state-based limitations on practice offer no particular help; I’m licensed in California, but I couldn’t tell you the first thing about most California law. The law has gotten so broad, so complex, that it’s illusory to think that someone licensed in a given state necessarily has any greater competence there.  But despite not having lived in the state for the last 14 years, and not having appeared in a California courtroom in nearly two decades, I could move there tomorrow and start representing clients.

Would it be so bad (for consumers) if law could be practiced without a license? Consumers could still choose to use someone who went to law school, or who met the membership requirements of a bar association. It just wouldn’t be their ONLY choice if they have anything remotely related to a legal question.

Or what if we adopted a system like the UK, where a license is only necessary to engage in certain “reserved activities,” such as representing clients in court, handling probate, and transferring real property?

I do think there are a lot of things that people need a “real” lawyer for. But I’m not convinced that our current system of state-based occupational licensing is really protecting consumers so much as it is protecting our cartels.

 

Time to Gut the Ad Rules

Avvo recently submitted its comments to the ABA’s “Future of Legal Services” Commission, and I wanted to highlight one of the specific suggestions we made:

Get rid of most attorney advertising regulation.

Or more specifically, eliminate everything other than restrictions on false advertising and real-time solicitation. Our suggested advertising rules would look like this:

Rule 7.1: A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.

Rule 7.2:  A lawyer shall not by in‑person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact solicit professional employment when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s pecuniary gain, unless the person contacted:

(1)  is a lawyer; or

(2)  has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with the lawyer.

Everything else in the attorney advertising rules – prohibitions on specific forms of advertising, hard-and-fast disclaimer requirements, vague provisions about “lawyer referral services” and the like – is the crusty accretion of over-regulation. Many of these provisions pre-date Bates v. Arizona, and would be contrary to lawyers’ First Amendment right to advertise were it not for some begrudging exceptions language that’s been bolted on.

Other provisions found in the RPCs of many states, such as pre-review of advertising (by a committee that may include a law firm’s competitors) and limitations on many forms of legitimate advertising, are fundamentally anti-competitive and often highly arbitrary in application.

As anyone who pays close attention to this area knows, there is absolutely nothing in this dog’s breakfast of regulations that actually buys us any greater consumer protection. 1 Anything egregious and harmful in attorney communication can be enforced via the general prohibition on false and misleading advertising.

What’s more, this thicket of regulation is actively harmful. I’ve spoken with hundreds, if not thousands, of attorneys over the last seven years about this topic. There is a general level of concern and uncertainty over what attorneys are “permitted” to say to potential clients. And lawyers, being the risk adverse creatures they are, tend to clam up.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted in some two dozen advertising cases over the last 40 years that consumers have a very strong interest in minimally restrained commercial speech. As the court observed in Bates:

[T]he consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue.

And yet, the Bar restrictions, with their often-byzantine level of detail and apparent reach into all manner of attorney speech, are preventing attorneys from providing consumers with the robustness of information necessary to make good purchasing decisions – or to get legal help at all. This is bad for consumers, and ultimately, bad for the Bar.

While there are other things that the profession can do to improve access to justice, one immediate and easy opportunity for improvement is to massively prune back attorney advertising regulation.

 

Notes:

  1. And consumers rarely complain about lawyer advertising violations; virtually all such complaints are filed by other lawyers.